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ARTICLES
THE DAMAGING IMPACT OF THE EASTMAN
KODAK PRECEDENT UPON PRODUCT
COMPETITION: ANTITRUST LAW IN NEED OF
CORRECTION
DANIEL J. GIFFORD*

In the dynamic markets of the present day, competition is the driving
force behind the widespread and pervasive development of new products
and new product capabilities. Innovative activity, which is especially
manifest in the high-technology sectors, contributes significantly to national
economic well-being.' Yet the courts, the bar, and most legal scholars have
given inadequate attention to the critical role that antitrust rules can play

in encouraging or stifling innovative activity.2 Rather, a good deal of the

* Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author
gratefully acknowledges helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article by Professors Leo Raskind
and Victor Kramer.
1. The development of new products and technology contributes to national economic well-being
because it generates new and higher value-added outputs. In addition, the development of new products
and technology generates positive externalities for the economy in the diffusion of skills and knowledge.
See, e.g., LAURA D'ANDREA TYSON, WHO's BASHING WHOM? TRADE CONFLICT IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRIES

12 (1993);

LESTER THuRow, HEAD TO HEAD

146 (1992).

2. Historically, the connection between antitrust and innovative behavior has focused upon the
patent-misuselantitrust interface and joint ventures for research and development. Congress has modified
judicially created doctrines governing patent misuse to provide wider protection to innovative activity
than the courts would otherwise have allowed. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988). Congress has also legislated
twice in the last decade to protect creative activities undertaken cooperatively. See the National
Cooperative Research and Production Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-42, 107 Stat. 117 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (Supp. V 1993)), which expanded the coverage of the National Cooperative
Research Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98462, 98 Stat. 1815 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305 (1988)).
Substantial scholarly attention was directed to the problems that led to the 1993 legislation. See, e.g.,
ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 56-57 (Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece eds.,
1992).
In the area of innovation at levels below that of the novelty required for patent protection, however,
International Logistics Group v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904, 908 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1066 (1990), is one of the few judicial opinions to advert explicitly to the danger of deterring
innovation engendered by overly expansive interpretations of the antitrust laws. The antitrust literature
is similarly lacking in its appreciation of the role of the antitrust laws in fostering product competition.
The few articles that address the positive role of product competition include: BErrY BocK, THE
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traditional antitrust literature has focused narrowly upon price and output
in relatively static market settings, and the newer strategic behavior branch
of antitrust writing has not focused on the potential dampening effect of

antitrust rules on innovative activity.3 The challenge for the antitrust law
of the 1990s, however, is to foster competition in the creation of new
products and new product capabilities; to act as a stimulus (and not as a
deterrent) to innovation.4
In this Article, I respond to this challenge by refocusing antitrust analysis
on the important matter of product competition-competition in the design
and development of new products and new product capabilities. I do that

here by directing my analysis to issues raised by the most important
judicial decision affecting product competition in decades: the United States
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Services, Inc.' Not only does that decision have major ramifications on
product competition, but the critiques6 of that decision have largely
INNOVATOR AS AN ANTITRUST TARGET (Conf. Board Info. Bull. No. 74, 1980); Joseph G. Sidak,
Debunking PredatoryInnovation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1121 (1983); and Case Comment, Antitrust
Scrutiny ofMonopolists' Innovations, 93 HARv. L. REV. 408 (1979).
3. On strategic antitrust analysis, see, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract
Penalties, Monopolizing Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1993); Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power
over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986); and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84
Micu. L. REV. 213 (1985).
4. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice appears to be aware of the role that
antitrust can play in fostering innovation and competition in developing new products. See U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property §§ 1, 2, 2.3,
5.3, 5.4 (Draft 1994), 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,141. See also Catherine Yang, Trustbusters Go
Gunningfor High Tech, Bus. WK., Mar. 7, 1994, at 64, 64. According to the cited article, Assistant
Attorney General (for Antitrust) Anne K. Bingaman is examining ways in which overly broad patent
or software copyright protection can stifle innovation. Id. The Division has brought and settled a suit
against Microsoft Corp. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 6 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 45,094, Case No.
4088 (1994) (summarizing the complaint and settlement agreement). That settlement, however, was
rejected by the district court and is currently under appeal. See CourtRejects ProposedConsent Decree
in Microsoft as Not in Public Interest, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 194 (Feb. 16, 1995).
5. 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).
6. The major focus of many of the critiques of the Kodak case has been the limitation of the
relevant market to the product of a single manufacturer and the market-information issue. See, e.g.,
articles cited infra note 27. Other commentators have directed their attention to still other issues raised
by that case. Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, for example, has used the EastmanKodak case as a basis
for analyzing the relations between markets for inputs and markets for final products in which the inputs
are components. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust Policy and the
Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1447 (1993). In this connection, he observes that where the input
constitutes a small part of the final product, the effect of the input producer's monopoly on the price
of the final product is small when measured in percentage terms. Id. at 1456-57.
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neglected the dampening effects of the Eastman Kodak precedent on
innovation. These ramifications are examined here.
In the following pages, I employ a critique of the Eastman Kodak case
to explore how the law of tying and monopolization can be misused to
discourage innovation. My argument is based upon a factual premise which
is patently obvious: product innovation often means the design and
manufacture of nonstandard equipment, equipment which necessarily
requires nonstandard replacement parts. My analysis then examines several
circumstances to which this set of affairs gives rise.
Part I sets the stage for the analysis that follows by describing the
Eastman Kodak decision and its ramifications for product competition. Part
II explores the legalities of the several situations in which a manufacturer
of nonstandard equipment may find itself: such a manufacturer almost
invariably will be selling replacement parts for its equipment; often it may
be selling service as well and sometimes it may provide (or want to
provide) exclusive service for its equipment. In Part II, the relation between
the production and sale of nonstandard equipment and nonstandard
replacement parts is examined first. I conclude that although equipment
owners are often as "locked-in" as anyone can be to a single source of
parts, there is no legally cognizable tie in such a circumstance. Second, the
legal consequences of an equipment manufacturer tying service to the sale
of equipment are examined. I conclude that there is no illegality when the
manufacturer lacks market power over equipment. Third, the specific
question raised in the Eastman Kodak case-the tie of service to nonstandard parts is raised and explored. I conclude that there is no legally
cognizable tie, essentially because the manufacturer lacks an incentive to
exploit the service market by charging supracompetitive prices for service.
Part III explores the reasons why a manufacturer of nonstandard equipment
would want to provide exclusive servicing for that equipment, and
concludes that the most likely explanation is to protect the equipment's
reputation. An alternative explanation is also identified, relating to the
capture of more of the economic value of the equipment. Finally, in Part
IV, the Article calls for the courts to rethink the way they impose burdens
of proof in antitrust cases. The most likely state of affairs (as indicated by
experience or economic analysis) should be presumed, and the party
asserting the rare or the unlikely should carry the burden of proving it.
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THE EASTMAN KODAK DECISION AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS FOR
PRODUCT COMPETITION

The Issues and Their Significance

The Eastman Kodak decision involved a producer of high-volume
photocopier and micrographics equipment. The Court ruled that Kodak's
entry into the business of servicing its own brand of equipment created
prima facie cases of both unlawful tying and monopolization, which Kodak
would be required to disprove at trial. The disposition of the case and the
Court's analyses of the tying and monopolization issues carry negative
ramifications for all manufacturers of physically differentiated products.
The case arose because Kodak (the equipment manufacturer) was the sole
source of replacement parts for its brand of equipment, which was
physically different from other brands. Kodak decided that it wanted to
service its own brand exclusively, and therefore refused to sell parts to
independent servicing organizations (ISOs) or to permit equipment owners
to use Kodak-supplied parts with ISO service. In the Court's view, this
behavior constituted a tie.' Kodak's behavior does not fit the conventional
tying language, because Kodak sold parts to equipment owners who needed
them with or without Kodak service, but it does fit the statutory model of
a tie.8 And, in the view of the Court majority, Kodak's refusal to sell parts
to the ISOs might also constitute monopolization of the Kodak-brand parts
market, depending in part upon whether Kodak could establish a "business
7. 112 S.Ct. at 2080 & n.8. The case is remarkably unclear as to the behavior constituting the
tie. The Court stated in the text of its opinion "that Kodak would sell parts to third parties only if they
agreed not to buy service from ISOs," id. at 2080, and then in an accompanying footnote restated
Kodak's behavior as selling "to third parties on condition that they buy service from Kodak." Id. at

2080 n.8. As pointed out infra note 8, the Court's first description appears to be the correct one. The
Ninth Circuit approached the issue in a slightly different way. That court read the provision in Kodak's
agreement with equipment owners, "that it [would] sell parts only to users 'who service only their own
Kodak equipment,"' as constituting the tie. Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d
612, 619 (9th Cir. 1990), ajJ'd, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992). Another circuit court read the same contractual
language as not constituting a tying agreement. Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d
680, 686 n.12 (4th Cir. 1992).
8. The tying offense was governed by section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988),
because its coverage is not restricted to commodities, as is that of section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1988). Because Kodak's behavior fits the analytical model employed in the latter
provision, it could be visualized as a tie: the Clayton Act describes a tie as a sale on condition that the
purchaser not use the goods of another. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988). In the instant case Kodak sold parts to
equipment owners on condition that they not use outside service supplied by a non-Kodak source. 112
S. Ct. at 2077.
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justification" for the refusal.9
The case raises a host of questions about the impact of the antitrust laws
upon a manufacturer of a physically differentiated product. As shown
below, however, the majority's analysis was flawed by two critical
oversights. First, the dependency by purchasers of nonstandard equipment
upon the manufacturer of that equipment for replacement parts does not in
itself give rise to an antitrust tying or monopolization offense. Hence,
equipment purchasers in the paradigm lock-in case are unprotected by the
antitrust laws. t" Second, a manufacturer of nonstandard equipment
exhausts whatever "power" it might possess in parts by pricing those parts
in accordance with what the market will bear, and thus has no ability to
exploit the market in servicing its brand of equipment to the disadvantage
of locked-in equipment owners." Because the Court majority recognized
neither of these aspects of the situation of a differentiated product producer,
it was led to an incorrect conclusion. Worse, the result exerts a significant
corrosive impact upon manufacturers' incentives to develop innovative
product designs.
B.

The Decision and Its Rationale
1. The Facts

Eastman Kodak involved an attempt by Kodak to take over the servicing
of its high-volume photocopier and micrographics equipment. Prior to
1982, Kodak had serviced that equipment. By 1982, independent servicing
organizations had begun to displace Kodak servicing. In 1985, however,
Kodak decided that it wanted to service its own brand of equipment
exclusively.' 2 Although Kodak continued to supply parts to ISOs to
service existing equipment, under its new policy Kodak no longer supplied
parts to the ISOs for use in servicing Kodak-brand equipment purchased
after 1985. Kodak, however, supplied parts to equipment owners who
wished to service their own equipment.' 3 Because of their inability to
9. 112 S.Ct. at 2091. In addition to the business justification issue, the determination of whether
Kodak-brand parts constitute a relevant market will be made at trial. The evidence which the plaintiff
ISOs mustered to preserve the relevant-market issue for trial was marginal at best. See infra pp. 153435.
10. See infra pp. 1522-23.
11. See infra pp. 1525-28.
12. 112 S.Ct. at 2077-78.
13. Kodak did insist that owners who purchased parts use the parts themselves and not resell them
to others. Justice Blackmun, citing the lower court's opinion, erroneously characterized that arrangement
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purchase replacement parts as needed, the ISOs lost much of their ability
to service Kodak-brand equipment.
The ISOs responded to the new Kodak policy by instituting a lawsuit
charging Kodak with a tying violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act and
with monopolization and attempted monopolization under section 2. The
asserted tie consisted of the sale of parts (the tying product) only on the
condition that the purchaser not take service (the tied product) from a nonKodak source.14 The section 2 charge was based upon Kodak's refusal to
sell parts and was premised on the existence of a brand-specific relevant
market: a market consisting of replacement parts for Kodak-brand
equipment. After the district court granted summary judgment for Kodak,
a divided Ninth Circuit reinstated both the tying and the section 2 claims.
The Supreme Court then affirmed the action of the Ninth Circuit in
reinstating both claims.
2. The Tying and Monopolization Issues
The tying issue turned on the application of the rule of "per se" illegality
to the alleged tie: Kodak's sale of parts to equipment owners only on
condition that they not purchase accompanying service from a non-Kodak
outside source. Under the conventional formulation, a tying arrangement is
treated as per se illegal if the seller possesses power in the market for the
tying product, and a "not insubstantial" volume of commerce in the market
for the tied product is affected. The underlying rationale for this rule has
been viewed as one of "coercion" or "forcing": if a seller controls a major
proportion of the tying product, it can force buyers who need the tying
product to purchase the tied product from it as well. The application of the
per se rule to Kodak depended critically upon whether a separate market
existed in Kodak-brand parts or whether, as Kodak maintained, competition
in the interbrand equipment market constrained its behavior in selling parts
and service. As with the tying, the monopolization issue turned on whether
a separate market existed in Kodak-brand parts and, if so, whether Kodak
had a duty to sell parts to its competitors in the service market.
as one in which Kodak sold parts only on condition that the buyer also take service. 112 S.Ct. at 2080
n.8 (citing Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1990)). The
cited portion of the lower court opinion deals with the agreement of owners purchasing parts to use the
parts themselves and does not deal with an agreement by owners to purchase service. See 903 F.2d at

619.
14. See supra note 8.
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3. The ProblematicNature of the Decision
The Eastman Kodak decision has been rightly understood as raising a
host of problems apart from its impact upon product competition. It
threatens to undo recent case law developments which had begun to reflect
a scholarly consensus that tying arrangements were not as pernicious as the
courts had been accustomed to asserting prior to the 1970s. 5 It raises
substantial issues about the selection and use of presumptions throughout
antitrust law as well as about the proper relation between antitrust
presumptions and the economic theory in which they are grounded.1 6 It
threatens the vitality, in antitrust law, of the summary judgment mechanism, which has proved of immense importance in shortening litigation.
The decision's failure to assess the impact of antitrust law upon product
competition, however, may be, in the long run, the most critical of all its
defects.
4. The Majority's Rationale: The Interplay Between the Lock-In Effect
and Market Information
In upholding the plaintiff ISOs' claims, the majority (speaking through
Justice Blackmun) employed a so-called lock-in analysis. Kodak held a one
hundred percent share of the "market" for Kodak parts. Equipment buyers,
once they purchased Kodak-brand equipment that was physically different
from rival equipment, were locked-in to Kodak replacement parts. The
majority believed that Kodak's one hundred percent share of the Kodak
replacement parts market was sufficient to give rise to a presumption of
market power in the Kodak-brand parts market. Then Kodak's presumed
power in the Kodak-brand parts market triggered the per se rule applicable

15. The Court began to strengthen the standards for meeting the per se rule in United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977). In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S.
2 (1984), the Court further heightened the showing of power in the tying product required for the
application of the per se rule, id., and four Justices sought to abolish the per se rule entirely. 466 U.S.
at 32-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16. The Court effectively presumed Kodak's power in a market of Kodak-brand parts from
Kodak's 100% share of that market, and cast upon Kodak the burden of establishing that competition
in the product market constrained its power in the parts and service aftermarkets. When antitrust
decisions allow presumptions of market power to be drawn from data on market share, they rely upon
economic theory. Yet, Kodak also relied upon economic theory in contending that the aftermarkets
should be presumed to be constrained by the equipment market. The Court failed to explain why it
chose to place the burden on Kodak of proving that it lacked market power when economic theory also
supported the presumption for which Kodak contended. Moreover, for reasons set forth in the text,
Kodak appears to have had the stronger position. See infra p. 1533.
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to tying arrangements.1 7 In defense, Kodak contended that it had no power
in the Kodak-brand parts market because its selling decisions over parts
were constrained by competition in the interbrand equipment market-buyers of Kodak-brand equipment were necessarily aware that they
would eventually require parts for repair and maintenance.'8 Any attempt
by Kodak to exploit its power as the sole source of replacement parts (to
equipment owners locked-in to Kodak parts) would make its equipment less
attractive vis-A-vis other brands and would divert sales to rivals. The same
constraint existed in the service market. According to Kodak, any attempt
to exploit the parts or service market by raising prices above competitive
levels would be equivalent to raising prices on equipment.' 9 And since the
interbrand equipment market-where Kodak apparently maintained only a
twenty to twenty-three percent share 2 -was concededly competitive, an
increase in price there would have diverted substantial sales to competi2
tors. '

Viewed in these terms, the crucial question was whether competition in
the interbrand equipment market exercised the constraining effect that
Kodak claimed. In theory, the interbrand equipment market should have
exercised that constraint, but the Court majority was unwilling to presume
that reality corresponded with theory. The majority's misgivings about
accepting a constraint postulated by theory were rooted in a suspicion that
some purchasers may not have been fully informed about the prices that
Kodak was charging for servicing. This suspicion was reinforced by
evidence that Kodak had apparently "[charged], through negotiations and
bidding, different prices for equipment, service, and parts for different
17. 112 S.Ct. at 2087-88.
18. Id. at 2081-82.

19. Id. at 2085.
20. The Ninth Circuit's opinion noted that Kodak estimated its share of the micrographics market

to be less than 20% and its share of the high-volume copier market to be approximately 23%, and that
the plaintiffs did not dispute Kodak's assertion that it lacked power in the interbrand equipment markets.
Image Technical Sew., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 616 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). The Supreme
Court decided the case on the assumption that competition existed in the equipment market. 112 S.Ct.
at 2081 n.10.
21. A similar argument was articulated by Judge Richard Posner in his dissenting opinion in Parts
& Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 236 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., dissenting),

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989). Professor Hay has pointed out that the constraint exercised by the
equipment market on the aftermarkets does not depend upon the existence of competition in the
equipment market, since even a monopoly price in the latter market will tend to be forced downwards
by price increases in the aftermarkets. See George A. Hay, Is the Glass Half-Empty or Half-Full?
Reflections on the Kodak Case, 62 ANTrrRusT L.J 177, 189 (1993).
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customers,"22 thus raising the possibility that the protection afforded by
competition in the interbrand equipment market was available to some, but
not all, buyers. Those buyers who learned about Kodak's alleged monopoly
pricing for service demanded and received offsetting price reductions on
that or other parts of the total package of equipment, parts, and service, but
less-informed buyers did not.23 Because of these concerns, the majority
placed on Kodak the burden of proving that the interbrand equipment
market constrained the servicing market.24
On the monopolization issue, the majority held that if the existence of
a separate market in parts were established at trial, Kodak would have the
burden of proving a "business justification" for its refusal to sell parts to
its rivals in the servicing market. Although Kodak came forward with
several justifications for its policy, the Court ruled that a trial was
necessary in order to determine whether those justifications were valid and
sufficient or merely "pretextual."2 5
Justice Scalia, writing for himself and Justices O'Connor and Thomas,
argued primarily in support of accepting the presumption urged by Kodak,
i.e., that competition in the interbrand equipment market constrained
Kodak's prices for parts and service. Secondarily, the dissent contended
that it was not the business of antitrust to protect consumers against
informational deficiencies.2 6
5. The Irrelevance of Market Information
In focusing upon market information as the critical issue, the Court
committed a significant error.27 It ignored the impact of its decision on
22. 112 S.Ct. at 2077. Justice Blackmun also characterized the ISO evidence as showing that
"consumers [have] switched to Kodak service even though they preferred ISO service, that Kodak
service was of higher price and lower quality than the preferred ISO service, and that ISOs were driven
out of business by Kodak's policies." Id. at 2081. Because this apparently anecdotal evidence does not
appear to convey information about market conditions generally, the ISOs could not have carried a
burden of establishing Kodak's power over parts and service on the basis of that evidence alone. It
appears, however, that the Court referred to this evidence in support of its determination to place the
burden on Kodak of proving that the aftermarkets are constrained by the primary market. Id. at 2088.
23. Id. at 2086-87.
24. Id. at 2088-89.
25. Id. at 2091 (quoting Image Technical Serv., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 618
(9th Cir. 1990).
26. Id. at 2097-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. A number of commentaries on the Eastman Kodak case have understandably focused attention
on market-information issues, as they affect the relations between a primary market and an aftermarket.
See, e.g., Joseph Kattan, Market Power in the Presence of an Installed Base, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 1
(1993); Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes it on the Chin: Imperfect Information Could Play a Crucial
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product competition and misunderstood the impact of market information
upon the market for the tied product (servicing). This Article will show that
deficiencies in market information were irrelevant to Kodak's pricing in the
service market and, hence, the Court's articulated concern with possible
exploitation by Kodak of its service customers was unfounded. Kodak had
no incentive to do anything other than to price service at competitive levels,
however much (or little) it might exploit its position in parts. And if service
is priced competitively, there can be no restraint of the service market and,
hence, no antitrust violation. Justice Scalia, in dissent, recognized that even
if Kodak possessed power over parts, it would price service competitively.28 He failed, however, to use this point to establish the irrelevance of
the market-information issue, a crucial element of the majority's analysis.

II.

THE MANUFACTURE OF A PHYSICALLY DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCT:
ANTITRUST RAMIFICATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF PRODUCT COMPETITION

A.

The Antitrust Frameworkfor Approaching Competition in Product
Design

1. Competition in Physically DifferentiatedProducts
The free market encourages producers to develop their own respective
packages of product characteristics in order to meet the needs and wants of
customers more effectively.2 9 Every market provides each manufacturer
with an incentive to develop a product that will outperform its rivals or will
meet the needs of an identifiable market segment in a superior way. In
order to meet these needs, equipment manufacturers may have to design
nonstandardized products. The result, then, in a market like that for
photocopying equipment, is a situation in which each manufacturer sells
equipment that is physically differentiated from equipment sold by its
rivals.
Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 193 (1993); Gordon B. Spivack & Carolyn T. Ellis,
Kodak: Enlightened Antitrust Analysis and Traditional Tying Law, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 210-12

(1993). Although the extent to that a primary market constrains an aflermarket is an intellectually
interesting question, much of the analysis that would apply to the relation between a single primary
market and a single aftermarket was legally irrelevant to the Eastman Kodak case because, as pointed
out in the text, infra pp. 1525-27, that case was complicated by a third market segment (i.e., the
aftermarket in parts in addition to the primary market in equipment and the aftermarket in service).
28. 112 S. Ct. at 2097 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
29. See Daniel J. Gifford, The InterplayofProduct Definition, Design and TradeDress, 75 MINN.

L. REV. 769, 774 (1991).
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The degree of success attained by any one producer relative to its rivals
in satisfying the needs and wants of customers is reflected in the brand
premium that its product commands. Indeed, it is the hallmark of a market
in which physically differentiated products compete for the favor of buyers
that prices vary from brand to brand, the relative "premiums" or discounts
reflecting the relative attractiveness of the brands.3"
2. Product Competition and the Antitrust Laws
When product competition motivates manufacturers to compete in the
designs of their products, each producing nonstandard equipment, one
necessary result is that purchasers of a particular brand of equipment
generally will be dependent upon the manufacturer of that brand for
replacement parts.
This dependency of the owners of a particular brand of equipment upon
the manufacturer of that brand for parts can be conceptualized in antitrust
terms. The manufacturer could be conceived as "tying" parts to equipment
by the very act of manufacturing physically differentiated equipment. Or,
the manufacturer could be conceived as a monopolist of its own brand of
parts, selling to equipment owners who are "locked-in" to that brand by
their investment in the equipment and, therefore, are vulnerable to
exploitation. Indeed, the claims in the Eastman Kodak case were variations
of these conceptual approaches.
This Article will show that conceptualizing the relation between the
owners of physically differentiated equipment and the manufacturers of that
equipment as involving a tying arrangement or monopolization is unsound
as an antitrust matter. It will also show that the variations of these
conceptual approaches employed by the Eastman Kodak majority were
similarly unsound. And finally, this unsoundness will be shown to be
intimately connected with the underlying role of the antitrust laws in
furthering product competition.
3. The Variables in an Antitrust Analysis of Product Competition
The kind of attack upon product competition that was made and
countenanced in Eastman Kodak is not new.3" It has been made in the
30. See, e.g., EDWARD H. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 71-116
(5th ed. 1946), for the classic description of this type of marketplace.
31. See, e.g., Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 847 (1989).
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past, with mixed success, in other lock-in type cases.32 The confusing
element in Eastman Kodak which facilitated the ISOs' success was the
inclusion of a third market segment (as opposed to most lock-in cases
which usually involve only two market segments). In EastmanKodak, there
were not only sales of equipment and parts, but also of service, all of
which were interrelated. As will be shown, it was the added complexity
provided by this third market segment (service) that tripped the majority
into serious error.
An understanding of the antitrust analysis appropriate to the product
competition context is assisted by an identification of the principal factors
that have arisen in the analyses of such cases. These include the so-called
lock-in effect; the primary market as a constraint upon the aftermarket; the
impact of buyer ignorance upon the operation of that constraint and the
possibility of price discrimination (which was the analytical contribution of
32. The lock-in analysis has received a mixed reception in the courts. In a few cases, purchases
of a physically differentiated product have been held to constitute a separate market for supplies, parts,
or equipment that are physically compatible only with that product. See id.; Digidyne Corp. v. Data
Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985); Heatransfer Corp. v.
Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,434 U.S. 1087 (1978). These rulings
have been supported at least implicitly by the lock-in analysis. In other cases, however, plaintiffs relying
on the lock-in approach have been unsuccessful, often because essential elements of proof were missing.
See Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (no evidence of
concerted activity); International Logistics Group, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., 884 F.2d 904 (1989) (no
power in tying product market); Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied,440 U.S. 939 (1979) (no separable market in servicing; no concerted activity);
Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 611 F.2d 286 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,447 U.S. 924 (1980) (flawed
lock-in analysis).
In General Business Systems v. North American Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1983), the
court accepted the contention (similar to that asserted by Kodak) that the prices in the aftermarket had
a direct effect on prices in the primary market, but the court concentrated primarily on the potential
entry of rival manufacturers into the aftermarket as controlling the defendant's power in the aftermarket.
Id. at 975. Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1986), resembled the EastmanKodak
case insofar as a manufacturer of equipment refused to make parts available to an independent servicing
organization competing with the manufacturer's servicing. Similar to the Eastman Kodak decision, the
court there held that the manufacturer's behavior would be subject to rule-of-reason evaluation but that
a trial was necessary to test the legitimacy of the manufacturer's asserted business justification. Id. at
1483. Service & Training, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992), another case
involving facts similar to those of Eastman Kodak, took the view that the defendant's behavior did not
constitute a tie. See supra note 7. In Tarrant Service Agency, Inc. v. American Standard, Inc., 12 F.3d
609 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2709 (1994), the Sixth Circuit rejected a monopolization
claim based upon an equipment manufacturer's unwillingness to sell the plaintiff replacement parts, but
in that case so-called interchangeable "duplicator" parts were manufactured by independent suppliers.
Id. at 613-15. In another case, however, that circuit felt compelled by the Eastman Kodak decision to
reverse itself and to order a new trial on a lock-in theory. Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 664-67 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 2700 (1994).
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the Eastman Kodak majority); and the distribution of a brand premium
between the primary and aftermarkets.
(a) The Lock-In Effect
In a market in which rival manufacturers compete with physically
differentiated products, customers are generally dependent upon the
manufacturer of equipment which they have previously purchased for
replacement parts.33 Because the design of equipment sold under each
brand is different from the design of rival brands, replacement parts that fit
one brand of equipment generally will not fit another brand. This
dependence of customers upon the manufacturer is measured by the
customers' "sunk costs": they cannot switch brands without losing their
investment in the equipment. They are locked-in to the same brand for
replacement parts. It was this lock-in phenomenon which underlay the
majority's decision in Eastman Kodak.
This lock-in phenomenon is common to products or equipment for many
kinds of uses. Persons who use Macintosh computers, for example, are
locked-in to the Apple operating system for software. Children who play
with Lionel trains are locked-in to that brand when they wish to add
additional equipment. Indeed, even a householder who has acquired several
sets of a certain pattern of china, say Wedgwood, is locked-in to that brand
when one or more additional place settings are needed.
(b)

The Primary Market as a Protection Against Exploitation of
Locked-In Customers

The economic analysis of the lock-in phenomenon confirms a common
sense understanding of the situation. The householders who need an
additional place setting of china are not at the mercy of the Wedgwood
Company. True, in order to shift to another supplier, the householders
would have to abandon their sunk investment in their existing Wedgwood
place settings and purchase duplicates from the new supplier. In order to
avoid that costly alternative, the householders may be willing, if necessary,
to pay a hefty premium to the Wedgwood Company. That situation does
not arise, however, because the Wedgwood Company's market is primarily
new buyers who do have realistic alternatives. The Wedgwood Company
33. For some products in which the aftermarket is sufficiently large (as in the automobile industry),
independent manufacturers may offer an alternative source of supply of replacement parts. See, e.g., In
re Borg-Warner Corp., 101 F.T.C. 863, 876-79 (1983).

1520

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 72:1507

must price its china in a range relative to the prices of rival brands of fine
china. Its prices will reflect the premium commanded by its superior
quality, but no more than that amount. While the householders may have
been willing to pay $600 for a place setting, they will be able to purchase
a place setting for only $200 because it is at that price level that the
Wedgwood Company maximizes its profits in the market for sales to new
buyers, where its products must compete with those of rival sellers.
In the example of the Wedgwood china, it is clear that competition in the
market for sales to new buyers protects the prior owner who wishes to add
(or replace) a place setting. A person who acquires a piece of equipment
that later needs repair is in a slightly different circumstance. Here, the
original equipment is sold in the market to new buyers, whereas replacement parts are sold in the market to locked-in prior owners. Common sense
suggests that when buyers become aware that replacement-part cost for any
brand of equipment appears to be substantial and out of line with the
comparable costs for competing brands, they will factor the cost of
replacement parts into the purchase price: they will tend to adjust upwards
the nominal purchase price of a brand whose parts prices are unduly high.
Economists would say that the expected cost of replacement parts is a part
of the total cost incurred in acquiring any particular brand. Buyers add the
costs of replacement parts (properly discounted to present value and for the
probabilities of needing them) to the sales price when they compare one
brand with its rivals.
(c) Buyer Ignorance and Price Discrimination
The extent to which the primary market constrains pricing in the
aftermarket depends, as Justice Blackmun suggested, upon the degree of
market information available to buyers.34 The primary market will not
reflect conditions in the aftermarkets if buyers in the primary market are
ignorant about the aftermarkets. Justice Blackmun, however, was making
a more complex statement than just that impediments may exist to the
communication of market information. Rather, he was stating that Kodak
discriminated in its pricing and that the discrimination was facilitated by
the ignorance of the disfavored buyers. The result of the discrimination,
according to Justice Blackmun's hypothesis, was that there were, in effect,
two primary markets: one in which well-informed buyers paid reduced
prices for equipment, the reduced prices reflecting abnormally high

34. EastmanKodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2085-87.
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aftermarket prices for brand-specific replacement parts or service; and a
second primary market in which uninformed buyers paid higher prices for
equipment, the higher prices being insulated from the depressing effect of
the high prices in the aftermarkets, which were unknown to these buyers.
The combination of buyer ignorance and price discrimination suggested
by Justice Blackmun is unlikely where a primary market in high-cost
equipment is operating competitively. Indeed, it is precisely in markets
where buyers invest substantial amounts that they are most likely to seek
out relevant information, and it is in competitive markets where rival firms
have an incentive to discover and to disseminate such unfavorable
information. It is also questionable to assume that the business purchasers
of expensive high-volume copiers and micrographics equipment would be
ignorant about prices for servicing." Yet, it is not necessary to quarrel
with Justice Blackmun's market-information hypothesis to establish the
flawed nature of the Eastman Kodak decision. The problem posed by
Justice Blackmun-the exploitation of the dependence of locked-in
buyers-is shown below not to constitute an antitrust problem.
(d) Distribution of Brand Premiums Between the Primary and
Aftermarkets
Producers of product lines which, because of their superior reputation,
command significant premiums may very well decide to distribute their
brand premiums between the original equipment markets and the
aftermarkets. The result in such cases is that prices are likely to exceed
marginal cost by some amount in both the primary and aftermarkets. The
producers would examine the cross-elasticities of the demands in the two
markets and adjust their respective prices to their optimum levels. In so
exploiting their brand premiums, these producers would not be exercising
anything remotely like market power36 and, for the reasons developed
35. These customers must have been aware of aftermarket and servicing charges, as they bear these
charges repeatedly on their other equipment. Any difference in pricing by Kodak is more likely to
reflect the bargaining positions of different customer groupings than customer ignorance.
36. It is true that in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04
(1969) (Former ) and United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962), the Court equated the
market power requisite to trigger the per se tying rule with product desirability and defined this
desirability in a way that is remarkably similar to the brand premium commanded by any product with
a superior reputation. That approach was abandoned in FortnerHI,however, when the Court indicated
that the power that would trigger the per se rule resided in the seller's possession of some economic
advantage unavailable to competing sellers. United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., 429 U.S. 610
(1977). The Court's further ruling, in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 26-27
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below, could not be involved in a violation of the antitrust laws.
The distribution of part or all of a brand premium to the aftermarket may
appear to the naive as exploitation of buyers in the aftermarket. Indeed, this
apparent exploitation may be perceived as monopolization or the leveraging
of the power of a tying product. Yet, the allocation of part of a brand
premium to the aftermarket is fully consistent with competitive conditions
in the primary market and with the complete interaction of the primary and
aftermarkets.
B. Equipment Design and the Antitrust Laws: The Concept of a Tie of
Parts to Equipment Resultingfrom ProductDesign
It is conceptually possible to argue that a producer ties parts to
equipment merely by manufacturing equipment which is designed
differently from its rivals and therefore requires nonstandard replacement
parts. The antitrust laws, however, have generally ignored any tie arising
from the sale of parts in the aftermarket by a seller of physically differentiated equipment, probably because it is impossible to eliminate such a tie
without requiring that all equipment be of a standardized design. Imposing
such a requirement would involve the courts in suppressing the very
creativity that lies at the core of a competitive marketplace.
Let me add that the creativity which the law-and particularly the
antitrust law in its role as guardian of competition in product design-values includes that of a manufacturer whose product occupies thirty
percent or more of the relevant market-a share probably sufficient to raise
an inference of market power for purposes of establishing a per se tying
violation.37 Indeed, the larger the market share, the more the producer
(1984), that a 30% market share was insufficient evidence of the requisite power confirmed the retreat
from the approach followed in FortnerL
Of overriding importance, moreover, is the obvious purpose of antitrust law to stimulate competition
in the development of new products. The desirability of this stimulus is confirmed by trademark law,
see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. 1994), which ensures that a producer is able to identify its
particular version ofa product class to customers, thus facilitating competition in differentiated products.
37. Less than a 30% market share was deemed insufficient to raise an inference of the market
power requisite to invoke the per se rule in Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 26-27 & n.43. In its now
repealed Vertical Restraints Guidelines, the Department of Justice employed the 30% figure as the
maximum safe-harbor share. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL RESTRAqNTS GUIDELINES § 5.3,
reprinted in 50 Fed. Reg. 6263, 6272 (1985). These guidelines were repealed in 1993. Anne K.
Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General, Speech to the American Bar Association Antitrust Section, Aug.
10, 1993, reprinted in 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 250 (1993). See also the discussion of
the market-power requirement in Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 672 (7th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1129 (1986).
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objectively demonstrates the value of its product and, implicitly, the
creativity behind it. To treat the sale of nonstandard parts by the manufacturer of physically differentiated equipment as a tie in an antitrust sense,
would be to cap the market shares of all manufacturers of nonstandard
equipment at something less than thirty percent, unless independent
manufacturers had entered the arena to offer alternative sources of supply.
Such a result would be, I suggest, untenable.
When the antitrust laws exclude from their cognizance the tie (of parts
to equipment) that results when nonstandard equipment is marketed, they
necessarily deny protection against supplier exploitation of the purchasers
of the nonstandard equipment who are locked-in to that supplier for spare
parts. Thus protection is denied in what is perhaps the paradigm lock-in
case involving parts. The denial of protection to locked-in owners is
absolute: this is not just a case in which the per se rule is inapplicable and
the customers are relegated to the difficult task of constructing a case under
the rule of reason. Rules of proof are irrelevant here because there is
substantively no offense. In this case a successful tying claim would
conflict with the basic goals of the antitrust laws and therefore cannot be
recognized at all. Since the antitrust laws must ignore a tie of parts to
equipment resulting from the nonstandard design of the equipment, sellers
of differentiated products are (and always have been) free to allocate a
brand premium between the equipment market and the parts market.
In addition to the overriding point that no relief against a lock-in is
practical withoutjeopardizing socially desirable creativity in product design,
several other considerations support the denial of such relief. First, the
impossibility of relief against the tie between parts and equipment resulting
from the production of nonstandard equipment strongly suggests that the
equipment and parts should be viewed as a single product. Second, the
production of physically differentiated equipment does not, in itself,
preclude independent manufacturers from making compatible replacement
parts, so the primary concern of the antitrust prohibitions against tying--exclusion of rivals from the market-is absent. Third, when market
information is readily available, the buyers are not exposed to the
unchecked power of the supplier because the supplier's price on parts is
constrained by competition in the interbrand equipment market. And in
most situations, it would be unlikely that sellers could impose substantially
burdensome terms upon buyers in the aftermarket without affecting the
primary market. Finally, because all equipment buyers are necessarily aware
that at some future dates they will require replacement parts at unspecified
future prices, they must have implicitly contemplated and accepted
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aftermarket prices within a wide range of reasonableness when they
purchased the equipment.
C. Equipment Design and the Antitrust Laws: Tying Service to
Equipment
As shown above, the conceptualization of the provision of parts by
manufacturers of physically differentiated products as tying arrangements
creates a substantial danger that the antitrust laws will erode the stimulus
to innovation which the competitive market engenders. That is why such
a conception is unsound and at odds with antitrust policy.
Does a manufacturer of nonstandard equipment engage in an unlawful
tying arrangement by tying service to equipment? For policy reasons which
are set forth below, the answer ought to be "no." The answer under existing
law is more complex. The clearest issue (and one that sheds some light on
the situation in Eastman Kodak) is that a manufacturer who lacks market
power cannot violate the per se rule by tying service to equipment.
Justice Scalia, in his Eastman Kodak dissent, discussed a tie between
service and equipment,"8 although his insightful discussion of this tie was
nevertheless incomplete. Under Scalia's interpretation of existing precedent,
a tie between service and equipment would arise in a situation in which an
equipment manufacturer sold the equipment on the condition that the
purchasers agree to use only the manufacturer's service organization for
maintenance and repair. It would also arise when the purchasers were
provided a lifetime service contract with the purchase of equipment. Justice
Scalia observed that absent power in the interbrand equipment market, no
per se case would be made out for tying service to equipment. 9 He did
not explicitly point out, however, ways in which a tie between service and
equipment is different from a tie between service and parts. In the tie of
service to equipment (but not necessarily in the tie of service to parts) the
equipment buyers would be aware of the tie of services to equipment at the
time of purchase.4" In the case in which the service contract was incorporated in the equipment sale, competition in the interbrand equipment market
would constrain the total price which the seller could charge. It is the other
case-where the buyer merely undertook an obligation to purchase services
38. 112 S. Ct. at 2095.
39. Id. (citing Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 13-14; Fortner11, 429 U.S. at 620; Northern Pac. R.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958)).
40. It is this awareness which defines the tie as between the equipment being purchased (the tying
product) and the service (the tied product).
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from the seller-which is closest to the Eastman Kodak facts. Here, as in
Eastman Kodak, some buyers might not be informed about the seller's
charges in the servicing market, and all buyers would be vulnerable to
(necessarily indeterminate) future price changes in the servicing market.
Yet, as Scalia pointed out, even in this case the per se tying rule would not
apply when the tying product was the equipment." Does an equipment
manufacturer violate the rule of reason by tying service to equipment?
Unless the manufacturer possesses market power, the answer is probably
not.42
D. Equipment Design and the Antitrust Laws: Tying Service to Parts
Now it is time to face the question raised in the Eastman Kodak case:
does a manufacturer of nonstandard equipment violate the prohibition
against tying by refusing to sell parts to independent servicing organizations? This question deserves a negative answer under both the per se rule
and the rule of reason. Whether or not an equipment manufacturer violates
the per se rule by tying service to parts depends upon whether the
manufacturer can exercise power over parts to impose a restraint on the
service market. Whether such a manufacturer violates the rule of reason
depends upon whether its behavior restricts output in the service market.
The Eastman Kodak majority assumed that Kodak demonstrated its power
in the Kodak-brand parts market by inflating the price of service. It is
argued below that this was a flawed approach to the problem, because an
equipment manufacturer selling service has no incentive to inflate the price
of service. Rather, even assuming that the equipment manufacturer
possesses monopoly power over parts, the final price to the customer for
servicing will be equivalent to the combination of a monopoly price for
parts and a competitive price for the remainder of the service.4 3 Therefore,
output in the service market will not be restricted. The conclusion is that
a tying violation cannot be legitimately established under either the per se
rule or the rule of reason.
41. 112 S. Ct. at 2095. The per se rule would not apply because the context makes clear that the
tying product was the equipment, over which Kodak lacked the requisite power.
42. A violation of the rule of reason requires an appreciable restraint in the market for the tied
product. In order to tie service to equipment, the tie would have to be arranged at the time of the sale
of the equipment when the manufacturer would lack power to impose such a restraint.
43. In the situation described, the parts manufacturer could prevent the substitution of service for
parts in those cases in which partial substitution was possible, thereby more fully exploiting whatever
power it posses in parts.
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1. Ties in Fixed Proportions
Those who follow tying analysis understand that the supposed tie
between parts and service is one that fits the description of a tie in "fixed
proportions." The customer who needs the part needs it in conjunction with

service. Any power over servicing that control over parts provides is
limited to those situations in which parts are needed for servicing. Power
does not exist over servicing that does not require parts. The asserted "tie"
thus appears to involve close to a one-to-one relationship between parts and

service. It is commonly accepted at this point that a tie in a fixedproportions context (i.e., where the tying and tied inputs are employed in
fixed proportions) cannot extend a seller's power over the tying product
(parts) into the market for the tied product (service).' Ward Bowman
45
established that point in the 1950s, and it is widely recognized today.
44. The contention that the Eastman Kodak case may be a variable-proportions case appears
spurious. The argument would be that service can substitute, to some extent, for parts, as when extra
maintenance would prolong the life of parts, thus decreasing the number of parts purchased. To the
extent that service is a partial substitute for parts, that substitutability reduces Kodak's power over parts.
In the typical variable-proportions context, an input monopolist integrates forward into the final
product to prevent the final product producer from substituting away from the monopolized input. Two
effects result from this forward integration: the monopoly power of the input monopolist is increased
because it no longer is constrained by the partial substitution of the other input (a negative welfare
effect); and inefficient substitution is eliminated (a positive welfare effect). The analogy here is that
Kodak would integrate into servicing to prevent ISOs from substituting service for parts. The problem
with that analogy, however, is that Kodak cannot prevent ISOs from substituting service for parts
because equipment owners are free to use ISOs for all servicing which does not require replacing parts.
Consequently, the possibility of applying the variable-proportions analysis here is reduced to the
following contention: equipment owners do not know beforehand whether their equipment needs parts.
They therefore hire Kodak servicing organizations to do all their servicing and these organizations make
sure that service is not substituted for parts. In reflecting upon the persuasiveness of such a claim, the
reader should consider the extent to which such substitution appears a priori possible and note that
(even if possible) the enhanced monopoly power of the input provider (Kodak) is partially offset by the
welfare enhancement resulting from removing the inefficient substitution of service for parts. Finally,
even if Eastman Kodak is analyzed as a variable-proportions case, the welfare effects of variableproportions cases are, in general, indeterminate. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to apply a per se
rule to a tie in such a context. See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL 168 (1983).
45. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., TyingArrangements and the LeverageProblem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 22-23
(1957). See also BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 44, at 28. Justice Scalia pointed out in a footnote that
the tie appeared to be in fixed proportions and that such a tie would not have exploited customers in
the service market. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2097 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Hay, supra
note 21, at 189 & n.37.
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2. The Lessons from VerticalAnalysis
The fixed-proportions analysis has been applied by the courts in the
vertical distribution context where the upstream input producer possessed
market power. In cases such as Paschall v. Kansas City Star,46 the courts
followed the prevailing economic analysis which posits that the power of
the input supplier is exhausted in marketing the input.4' An input
supplier's determination to switch from one final product producer to
another does not increase the power of an input supplier at all. Indeed, a
sale by a monopoly input supplier to a monopoly output producer produces
less profit to the input supplier than would the sale by that supplier to
output producers operating competitively. In this situation, the ultimate
market restriction on the final product is lessened when the monopoly input
supplier vertically integrates with the monopoly output producer. Stated
another way, a monopoly input producer maximizes its profits and power
when it sells its input at a monopoly price to competitively operating output
producers. Thus a monopoly input supplier who integrates into final
product production has an incentive to charge no more for the final product
than an amount equal to the monopoly price of the input plus a competitive
price for the final product.
Thus prior antitrust case law-as well as economic theory-teaches that
Kodak would maximize whatever "monopoly" power it possesses over
locked-in owners by charging monopoly prices for parts. Kodak stands to
gain no more in revenue from seizing control of the business of servicing
Kodak machines. Accordingly, there appears to be a reason other than
revenue-maximization why Kodak took over the servicing of its machines.
I say "appears," because I will identify below a revenue-generating reason
that might explain Kodak's behavior, but that has little, if anything, to do
46. 727 F.2d 692, 701-04 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 872 (1984).
47. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 44, at 31-36; M.L. Greenhut & H. Ohta, Related Market
Conditions and InterindustrialMergers, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 267 (1976); John R. Haring & David L.
Kaserman, RelatedMarket Conditions andInterindustrialMergers: Comment, 68 AM. ECON. REv. 225
(1978); M.L. Greenhut & H. Ohta, Related Market Conditions and InterindustrialMergers: Reply, 68
AM. ECON. REv. 228 (1978); EUGENE M. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 209-11 (1968); Richard S.
Markovits, Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397, 1402 (1967); R.G.D.
ALLEN, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR ECONOMISTS 381 (1938). Professor Hovenkamp provides an
illustration of a firm which moves from selling only jars under its patent to selling jars and lids as a
package, and shows how the firm maximizes its profits by selling the package at an amount equal to
the monopoly price for the jar plus a competitive price for the lid. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 8.4 (1985). On forward integration, see also DANIEL J. GIFFORD &
LEO J. RASKIND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 150-53 (1983).
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with monopoly or monopoly power. As I point out below, however, the

most likely explanation for Kodak's behavior is not a revenue-related
reason at all, but a desire by Kodak to control servicing because of
servicing's potential for affecting the reputation of Kodak's brand of
equipment.
E.

Product Competition and the Monopolization Offense

Much of the analysis applicable to the relation of tying to product
competition also applies to the relation of the monopolization offense to
product competition. Thus, a manufacturer of nonstandard equipment
cannot be found to have monopolized merely because equipment purchasers
become dependent upon the manufacturer for replacement parts. As
explained above, a contrary ruling would severely impair the incentive to
innovate. Again analogous to the tying context, a manufacturer of
nonstandard equipment could not be found to have monopolized by
conditioning the sale of equipment to service unless it possesses power in
the interbrand equipment market.
To what extent ought the monopolization clause be implicated by the
refusal of a manufacturer of nonstandard equipment to sell parts to
competitors in the service market? The Court in Eastman Kodak indicated
that whether the monopolization clause is triggered depends upon whether
the manufacturer possesses a valid "business justification" for its refusal.48
One ground claimed by Kodak was the protection of the reputation of its
brand of equipment from unfounded charges of equipment malfunction by
incompetent servicing organizations,49 and the Court majority appeared to
accept such a justification, provided that Kodak proved its validity at trial.
As argued below, placing the burden upon an equipment manufacturer
to prove such a justification at trial is a mistake. True, placing such a
burden on a manufacturer in Kodak's position follows the procedural
format outlined in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,"
48. 112 S. Ct. at 2091. A related issue is whether a manufacturer like Kodak could be held to have
attempted to monopolize the market for servicing Kodak-brand equipment as a result of its refusal to
sell parts to independent servicing organizations. Of course, if competition in the equipment market
sufficiently constrains the aftermarkets, the possibility of monopolization is eliminated and there can
be no attempted monopolization. But even if it is assumed that the equipment market does not constrain
the service aftermarket, it appears that no finding of attempted monopolization of the service market
would be possible to the extent that Kodak is successful in establishing a business justification for its

behavior.
49. 112 S. Ct. at 2091.
50. 472 U.S. 585, 608-11 (1985).
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where a monopolist was required to justify its refusal to do business with
a rival. Yet, in the Eastman Kodak context, this procedural format ensures
that a manufacturer who wishes to provide exclusive service to its own
brand of equipment is forced to incur the risks and expense of trial, and
thus penalizes a course of apparently efficient behavior.s Moreover, the
manufacturer's power and incentive to exploit the service market are
constrained: first, by the prima facie impact that supracompetitive pricing
in the service market would exert upon prices in the primary interbrand
equipment market (as Kodak maintained); and, second, by the fact that
whatever power that manufacturer possesses over parts is exhausted in the
sale of the parts.
Given the actual or likely constraints upon exploitation of the service
market, the obvious reasons that an equipment manufacturer would wish to
guard its reputation, and the paucity of evidence that the plaintiff ISOs
mustered in opposition, 2 the Court ought to have imposed a higher
threshold upon plaintiffs opposing summary judgment. In other antitrust
cases, the Court has imposed high standards of proof upon plaintiffs when
it questioned the economic plausibility of their cases. 3 The economic
plausibility of the case of the ISOs was questionable, and a higher standard
ought to have been imposed.
III.

THE REASONS WHY KODAK OR OTHER MANUFACTURERS OF
NONSTANDARD EQUIPMENT MIGHT WISH TO PROVIDE EXCLUSIVE

SERVICE TO THEIR EQUIPMENT

As critics of the antitrust case law involving tying arrangements have
long pointed out, tying arrangements often have legitimate-indeed,
procompetitive-purposes. Kodak, like other manufacturers who have
employed tying arrangements, probably was motivated by goals that were
either innocuous or procompetitive when it decided to make parts available
only to owners and to Kodak servicing organizations.
51. As explained below, the most likely reason that such a manufacturer would wish to service
its own brand exclusively is to ensure quality servicing and to protect the reputation of the brand. See
infra pp. 1530-31.
52. The ISOs presented evidence that "ISOs provide quality service" and that some equipment
owners prefer ISO service. 112 S. Ct. at 2091. This evidence does not appear to be inconsistent with
Kodak's asserted concern to avoid injury to the reputation of its equipment resulting from ISOs
attributing equipment malfunctions to deficiencies in the equipment.
53. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2578, 2595-98 (1993);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 596-97 (1986).
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Enhancement of Quality and Reputation
Kodak's decision not to sell parts to the ISOs probably was motivated
by Kodak's desire to ensure that its copiers were properly serviced, thereby
ensuring that the equipment's reputation was not adversely affected as a
result of servicing by untrained or unqualified personnel. Indeed, Kodak
asserted such a reason as a "business justification" in defense of the
monopolization charge. 4 Such a motivation is a classic reason for tying
and one which the courts have had great trouble accepting.5 The majority
expressed doubt about Kodak's explanation because Kodak was willing to
56
sell parts to owners who performed their own repairs and maintenance.
But the mere fact that Kodak was willing to allow an exception for owners
does not prove that it was not concerned about ensuring quality servicing.
Owners who performed their own servicing might, on the average, be larger
operations than owners who used independent servicing organizations.
Accordingly, their larger size would mean that they could support in-house
servicing organizations that were focused upon their own equipment.
Moreover, in such cases problems with the performance or lack of
performance of Kodak-brand equipment could be examined by the owner
directly, rather than through an independent organization that would have
an incentive to blame the equipment for poor performance actually caused
by inadequate servicing.
In employing its servicing tie in order to protect the reputation of its
brand of equipment, Kodak was actually on stronger case law ground than
the majority opinion recognized. The courts have repeatedly faced the
contention that it was necessary for the seller of equipment to tie supplies
(or another tied product) to equipment in order to protect the equipment's
reputation. The tie guards against inferior supplies, so the argument runs,
which might cause the equipment to break down and thereby tarnish its
reputation. The standard judicial response to this claim has always been that
a less restrictive alternative is available: specifying quality standards for
supplies.5 7 Only when it is impractical to specify such standards does the
need for a tie become plausible. Servicing is a kind of product that eludes

A.

54. Eastman Kodak, 112 S. Ct. at 2091.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.

56. The majority dealt with this matter in the part of its opinion addressing the section 2 issues.
112 S. Ct. at 2091.
57. International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936).

1994]

DAMAGING IMPACT OF EASTMAN KODAK

1531

specification. Indeed, in the well-known JerroldElectronics58 case, it was
precisely the impracticality of specifying quality standards for service that
led the Court to accept as legitimate the tie of servicing to the sale of
community television antennae, even when otherwise the facts met the
requirements of the per se rule.
As established in the last section, Kodak would not gain anything in
revenue from integrating forward into the servicing market. It was already
the sole supplier of nonstandard replacement parts for Kodak-brand
equipment, and whatever market power Kodak held over owners of Kodakbrand equipment was fully exercisable in the sale of parts. After charging
what the market would bear for its parts in its role as parts supplier, its
incentive as a servicer would be to hold service prices at competitive levels.
B. A Retroactive Brand Premium?
For the reasons explained above, Kodak probably sought to control
servicing in order to enhance the reputation of its brand of equipment. And
for reasons already stated, Kodak would not exploit the servicing market
by charging more than a competitive price for servicing. Kodak would,
however, have an incentive to exploit whatever power it might possess over
parts. The exploitation of its power over parts might show up in the total
bill for servicing, but the servicing bill should not "exceed the total of the
parts price plus a competitive price for service. If Kodak had power in the
Kodak-brand parts market, the assertions by the ISOs that Kodak's
servicing prices were high compared to ISO servicing prices might be
explained by a high parts-charge component of the servicing bills. Yet,
Kodak's power in the Kodak-brand parts market should have been
constrained by competition in the interbrand equipment market. Is it likely
that, as suggested in the majority opinion, Kodak was able to avoid the
constraint of the interbrand equipment market as a result of impediments
to information transmission? If not, then as argued below, the burden
should have fallen on the ISOs to prove that Kodak's pricing behavior was
unconstrained.
It is possible that even if the service market was constrained by the
interbrand equipment market, Kodak nonetheless possessed some leeway
to generate revenue through aftermarket sales. In such a circumstance,
Kodak might have sold its parts at a premium over the prices of compar58. United States v. Jerrold Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'dper curiam, 365
U.S. 567 (1961).
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able parts for other brands. In context, that would mean that Kodak's
charges for servicing would reflect a relatively high parts-charge component. Such a higher parts-charge component would merely be Kodak's way
of distributing the competitive price for its equipment between the actual
equipment and the replacement aftermarket, an allocation discussed above.
Moreover, as pointed out below, a premium allocated to parts might be a
way of charging a retroactive brand premium to buyers. I argue here that
neither this ability to charge premium prices for parts nor its exercise
constitute matters of antitrust concern.
Suppose that when Kodak first placed its copiers on the market, the
market did not appreciate fully the quality of this brand of equipment-that
it took a number of years for the reputation of Kodak-brand equipment to
rise to its present level. As the reputation of the Kodak-brand equipment
rose, Kodak would be able to increase its price vis-A-vis rival equipment,
the premium for the Kodak-brand equipment reflecting its superior quality.
Let us consider for a moment the means available to Kodak to increase the
price of its equipment vis-A-vis rival equipment. The normal way in which
firms reflect the superior reputation of their product is to increase the price
of the product directly. However, this method captures the quality/reputation premium only prospectively: it is only new purchasers who
incur this premium. An alternative way to raise price would be to raise the
price on parts or on the parts component of servicing (when the servicing
was performed by the equipment manufacturer). If Kodak controlled the
servicing market through its control of parts, Kodak would have been able
to raise the price of the parts component of servicing to reflect the
enhanced reputation of its brand of equipment. This increase would
necessarily raise the effective price of the equipment but, in the case
supposed, would not have been a deterrent to raising the price of the parts
component of servicing, because increasing that price would have been only
a means of carrying out an intended increase in price for the equipment.
In short, in a market composed of differentiated products, the price of
any particular brand reflects not only the overall relation between aggregate
demand and supply for all product variations taken together, but also the
particular premium or discount commanded by that brand's particular
variation. The premium (in relation to the market as a whole) rises or falls
with the brand's reputation. Allocating some of the brand premium to parts
(or the parts component of service) enables the equipment seller to extract
an enhanced brand premium not only from new buyers but from old buyers
as well; in effect, this allocation enables the seller to extract a retroactive
brand premium.

1994]

DAMAGING IMPACT OF EASTMAN KODAK

1533

The case does not demonstrate whether Kodak was attempting to
enhance its revenues in the manner described. If Kodak did so, it was
merely collecting a premium merited by the superior reputation of its brand
of equipment.
IV.

AN ENLIGHTENED APPROACH TO PRESUMPTIONS IN
ANTITRUST CASES

In addition to its unsettling effect on product competition generally, the
Eastman Kodak decision exacerbates the threat to product competition
through its use of presumptions.
Because Kodak had nothing to gain by charging supracompetitive prices
for servicing, Kodak must have had some other reason for the tie of service
to parts. I have already pointed out the most plausible reason: to prevent
the ISOs from falsely attributing equipment malfunctions to equipment
quality rather than to inadequate service. Since there is no apparent
anticompetitive reason for the tie and there is a plausible procompetitive
reason for that tie, the Court should have presumed that the tie was
procompetitive or efficiency enhancing. The plaintiffs, who asserted that the
tie produced anticompetitive effects, would then be put to their proof. If
they could muster proof that the tie reduced output, they would be entitled
to go to trial. If, as is likely, they would be unable to muster substantial
proof of such a result, the case could have been dismissed. Subjecting
business firms to costly litigation over practices which appear, on the
surface, to be efficiency enhancing when there is no substantial evidence
to the contrary is patently in conflict with the core purposes of the antitrust
laws. Surely presumptions ought to further the efficient and accurate
disposition of cases. 9
According to the Court's own carefully articulated criteria for summary
judgment worked out in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,0 Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc.,61 and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.,62 the party bearing the burden of proof is vulnerable to a motion
for summary judgment if it cannot make a showing that it will be able to
59. Compare USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983), where, in the case of a patentee without market power, Judge Posner
suggested that the burden of proof ought to be borne by the party whose position was the less probable
one.
60. 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
61. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
62. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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present sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a jury verdict in its favor.
Anderson made clear that the sufficiency of that evidence is to be tested by
the standard of proof which that party must meet at trial. 63 And
Matsushita held that a requirement of economic plausibility is to be read
into the standard of proof in antitrust trials.' In the instant case, the
ISOs-like plaintiffs generally-bore the burden of persuasion on the issue
of a law violation by the defendant. Under current law, the plaintiffs were
entitled to prove that law violation by utilizing the per se rule governing
ties if they could bring themselves within the rule's coverage. On the latter
issue, the plaintiffs bore the burden of persuasion. To do so, the plaintiffs
had to prove the defendant's power in the tying-product market. That, in
turn, required proof of a market for the tying product. Proof of a separate
Kodak-brand parts market and power in that market was also crucial to the
plaintiff's monopolization claim.
The critical issue, then, was whether there could be a separate market for
Kodak-brand parts. On that issue the ISOs should have borne the burden
of persuasion. When the Court ruled against Kodak on the summary
judgment issue, the Court was indicating that the ISOs possessed sufficient
evidence to sustain a jury determination that an economically significant
market existed in Kodak-brand parts, separate from the interbrand
equipment market. Yet, the opinion is remarkably unclear on the evidence
that the ISOs brought forward on that issue. Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion suggests that evidence of increased prices and excluded competition
in service would be adequate to support a jury determination of a separate
market in Kodak-brand parts.65 The excluded competition in service, of
course, is conclusory. It refers to the Kodak policy of selling Kodak-brand
parts only to owners. The high prices in service factor to which his opinion
makes reference is meaningful only in relation to ISO prices for servicing
Kodak-brand equipment, and then only in a situation in which the ISOs'
63. 477 U.S. at 252.

64. 475 U.S. at 587, 596-97. See also Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,
113 S. Ct. 2578, 2598 (1993).
65. Justice Blackmun stated: "It is clearly reasonable to infer that Kodak has market power to raise
prices and drive out competition in the aftermarkets, since respondents offer direct evidence that Kodak
did so." 112 S. Ct. at 2088.
As previously observed, the Court addressed the issue of a brand-specific market more directly in
the part of its opinion discussing the alleged section 2 violation. See 112 S. Ct. at 2090 & n.31. In that

section of its opinion, the majority conceded that market definition presents a factual issue but relied
upon the physical uniqueness of the Kodak-brand parts to create a prima facie case of a separate market.

Id.
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supply costs for Kodak-brand parts are the same as those of the Kodak
servicing operation with which they are compared. Since Kodak did not
make the Kodak-brand parts available to the ISOs, it is not entirely clear
how such a comparison could be made. If the prices of Kodak-brand parts
reflected the brand premium on the Kodak equipment, higher prices for
Kodak-brand parts, and hence a higher input-cost component of servicing,
would be consistent with no market power in Kodak-brand parts and with
the prices of Kodak-brand parts being constrained by competition in the
interbrand equipment market. The latter circumstance would be indicative
of no separate market in Kodak-brand parts.
Even apart from its disappointing result, the opinion fails to satisfy that
standard of clarity which the legal profession has a right to expect of all
Supreme Court antitrust decisions. The Court grants certiorari in a case like
the present one in order to clarify the law and to provide direction to the
lower courts and the practicing bar on how the antitrust laws should be
administered. When the evidence that the plaintiff submitted is described
in such vague and imprecise language as that used by Justice Blackmun, 6
the law remains unclarified. The message that is communicated is that very
little economically significant evidence of the existence of a brand-specific
market will suffice to overcome a motion for summary judgment and to
support a jury verdict. Perhaps that is the Court's intention.6' That result
will stimulate litigation and foster trials in nonmeritorious cases. It is
especially unfortunate that the Court appeared oblivious to the ramifications
of its approach on product innovation.
In Eastman Kodak, the Court had the opportunity to address one of the
major issues of the day: how to prevent antitrust analysis from casting a
pall upon product innovation and thus acting as a suppressant upon the very
type of activity which the antitrust laws are intended to stimulate.
Unfortunately, the Court majority failed to meet the challenge.

66. See supra p. 1534.
67. Yet, in other antitrust cases, the Court has imposed a demanding threshold of economically
plausible evidence. See, e.g., Brooke Group, 113 S. Ct. at 2597-98.

